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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of identifying and estimating the normal-form payo pa-
rameters of a simultaneous, discrete game of complete information where the equilibrium
concept employed is correlated equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium. We show that
once we extend the equilibrium concept from Nash equilibrium to correlated equilibrium,
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cation and estimation of game-theoretic econometric models becomes simpler,
since this extension avoids the usual requirement of computing all the equilibria of a given
game. To deal with the presence of multiple equilibria, unlike most other work on empir-
ical games, we make use of the moment inequality restrictions induced by the underlying
game-theoretic econometric models without the need to make any equilibrium selection as-
sumptions. The resulting identied features of the model are sets of parameters such that
the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the em-
pirical choice probabilities estimated from the data. The importance sampling technique
is used to reduce computational burden and overcome the non-smoothness problems. We
also show that the model selection tests for moment inequality models can be used to test
equilibrium concepts such as correlated equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory, and much progress
has been made in clarifying the nature of strategic interaction in economic models. It is
the benchmark theoretical model for analyzing strategic interactions among a few players.
Given the importance of gaming in economic theory, the empirical analysis of games has
been the focus of much recent literature in econometrics and industrial organization. Since
the seminal work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), it is common to assume, as in a
standard discrete choice model, that each player's utility or payo is a linear function
of covariates and a random preference shock. However, unlike a discrete choice model,
utility also depends on the actions of other agents.
Although there are numerous studies on the empirical estimation of a wide range
game-theoretic econometric models, the most widely studied is the class of incomplete in-
formation games (both static and dynamic1. Complete information games have received
less attention due to their computational complexity, since estimation involves multidi-
mensional integrals. Moreover, complete information will generally induce the presence
of multiple equilibria (Morris and Shihn (2003)). Dealing with multiple equilibria is a
dicult task because a particular realization of observables and a particular set of payos
may be consistent with dierent model outcomes. To address the problem presented by
the requirement to compute multidimensional integrals, Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010)
and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) provide simulation-based estimators for static complete
information games. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) outline three main alternatives to ad-
dress the presence of multiple equilibria. The rst approach is to introduce an equilibrium
selection mechanism that determines which equilibrium will be played among several equi-
libria. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Jia (2008) are examples of such an approach.
1Studies of incomplete information static games include Sweeting (2005), Seim (2006), Aradillas-
Lopez (2007, 2010) and Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010), while the studies of dynamic game
includes Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) among others.
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While an equilibrium selection mechanism allows for identication the underlying game,
in general, we have limited knowledge about the equilibrium selection mechanism, and
any misspecication about it will lead to inconsistent estimation. The second approach
which was rst used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) is to map the sets of equilibrium
action proles associated with a particular set of payo prole to some other variable
that is constant over each set. In Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), for example, the variable
used is the number of entrants in the market. Of course, this is a useful method only as
long as such a variable can be found. The last approach, proposed by Tamer (2003), is
to partially identify parameters and thus, eliminate the need to make assumptions about
any underlying equilibrium selection mechanism. Berry and Tamer (2007) and Ciliberto
and Tamer (2009) are examples of this approach. Although each of these approaches
can make inferences in the presence of a multiplicity of equilibria, a common practical
issue is that all of them require computation of all the Nash equilibria of the underlying
game. This heavy computational burden will make estimation extremely dicult, if not
impossible, when dealing with large games2.
Here, we depart from the commonly used equilibrium concept { Nash equilibrium,
and assume that the outcome of the game is generated by a broader rationality rule
proposed by Aumann (1974, 1987){ correlated equilibrium. A most interesting feature of
this alternative equilibrium concept is that the identication and estimation of empirical
games become simpler, even though it enlarges the corresponding equilibrium set3. Yang
(2007) also uses the concept of correlated equilibrium to estimate simultaneous-move,
discrete game of complete information4. In contrast to his paper, our error structure is
more general, as will be discussed in section 2. As a result, the moment conditions used
2Mckelvey and Mclennan (1996) analyze the dierent computational methods for computing the set
of Nash equilibria for general games and point out the diculty associated with this issue.
3Chwe (2007) also studies the identication of games based on correlated equilibrium in a deterministic
environment.
4We were unaware of this research until our own work was completed, and are grateful to Zhou Yang
for bringing it to our attention.
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for estimation dier between the two papers. The advantages of correlated equilibrium in
the context of identication comes from its convexity, that is, any convex combination of
correlated equilibria is also a correlated equilibrium, a property not held by the set of Nash
equilibria. This property reduces the computation burden associated with estimation.
We also adopt the partial identication approach to deal with the presence of multiple
equilibria following Berry and Tamer (2007) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), where the
identied set is characterized by moment inequality restrictions. However, our approach
does not require the computation of all the equilibria (either correlated or Nash), but only
needs to compute some "extreme" equilibria{equilibria that realize a particular outcome
least or most, which can be obtained from simple linear programming. This does not
mean that computing the required set of correlated equilibria is simple5, the key feature
is that it does not need the whole set of equilibria. The importance sampling technique
is used to approximate the multi-dimensional integrals associated with these extreme
equilibria. Given the existing research on empirical games based on Nash equilibrium,
and the results established in this paper based on correlated equilibrium, we also provide
a framework for testing equilibrium concepts based on the moment inequality model
selection test developed by Shi (2010). The nested relationship between Nash equilibrium
and correlated equilibrium makes this test similar to the famous Hausman test (Hausman,
1978).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete, static,
complete information game to be estimated and formulate the implied equilibrium condi-
tions associated with the concept of correlated equilibrium. Several important properties
of correlated equilibrium are also presented. In section 3 we discuss the problem of partial
identication of the model. Section 4 describes the procedure for estimating the identied
set which is formulated in section 3, and also describes how importance sampling is used
5Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (2008) develop a polynomial-time algorithm for nding correlated
equilibria and also discuss the diculty in computing the complete set of correlated equilibria.
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to approximate the evaluation of multiple integrals and the computation of \extreme"
correlated equilibria. Section 5 introducing a test procedure for testing the behavioral
hypothesis of correlated equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium. A simple Monte Carlo
experiment is conducted in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We use the strategic environment of Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) to develop our es-
timation method. There are T independent repetitions of a simultaneous-move (normal
form) discrete game of complete information. In each game there are i = 1; :::; N play-
ers. In each repetition of this game, each player i chooses an action ai from the nite
set of actions Ai simultaneously. Dene A
N = iAi and let a = (a1; :::; aN) denote a
generic element of A. Player i's von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility is a mapping
ui : A
N ! R, where R is the real line. We will follow the convention of Bajari, Hong, and
Ryan (2010) and sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when no ambiguity would
arise.
The vNM utility of player i is assumed to be:
ui(a; xi; i; 1) = i(xi; a; 1) + i(a) (1)
where a 2 AN . In Equation (1), player i's vNM utility from outcome a is the sum of two
terms. The rst term i(xi; a; 1) is a function which depends on the vector a of actions
taken by all of the players, the covariates x, which are observed by the econometrician, and
parameters 1. The second term i(a), is a random preference shock which reects all the
information about utility that is common knowledge to the players but not observed by the
econometrician. Unlike most other study on empirical games, here the preference shocks
depend on the entire vector of actions a, not just the actions taken by player i. As argued
5
by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), this is a more general error structure than normally
assumed in the literature, for example Tamer (2003). As a simple example, consider a
simple two-rm entry game. This structure allows for the information unobserved by
the econometrician about a rm's payos to depend not only on his choice of whether
or not to enter a market but also on the choice of the other rm. Let i denote the
vector of the individual shocks i(a) and  denote the vector of all preference shocks,
i(a) are assumed to be independent with a density gi(i(a)j2) and joint distribution
g(j2) =
Y
i
Y
a2A
gi(i(a)j2), where 2 denotes the parameters of the distribution.
For each repetition t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg of the game with the above structure, the researcher
observes covariates xt and the outcome at (a vector of the actions chosen by the players
in period t). Unlike most other studies of empirical games (e.g., Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)), we assume that observed outcomes are consistent
with the concept of correlated equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium. As a general-
ization of Nash equilibrium, Aumann (1974, 1987) shows that correlated equilibrium is
the appropriate solution concept if players do not know the beliefs of other players but
that in every state of the world each player's rationality is common knowledge. The most
notable feature of correlated equilibrium is that it does not require explicit randomization
on the part of the players. Rather the equilibrium can be interpreted as a set of (possibly)
correlated signals that players receive that determine a unique optimal choice.
Formally, assume the game structure dened above, and let (
; ) be a probability
space, Pi be a partition of 
, i = 1; :::; N , and let
Qi = fqi : 
! Aijqi is Pi measurable:g (2)
If we refer to the partition as Pi = fPi(!)g!2
, where Pi(!) is the element of the partition
containing !, then correlated equilibrium can be dened as6:
6This following denitions and discussion of correlated equilibrium follow Bergin (2005). Similar
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Denition 2.1 (Correlated Equilibrium) The collection (
; ; fPigNi=1; fqigNi=1) is a
correlated equilibrium if 8i,
X
!
ui(q i(!); qi(!))(!) 
X
!
ui(q i(!); i(!))(!), 8i 2 Qi (3)
where for each i, qi is constant on each member of Pi.
Intuitively, given the information received through the partitioning of 
 and the real-
ized state !, players choose actions to maximize their expected utility. Thus, (3) dene
sucient conditions for this utility maximization.
The formulation of a correlated equilibrium in Denition 2.1 allows for complete ex-
ibility in dening the elements of the state space of a correlated equilibrium and, thus,
leads to a broad range of interpretations of a correlated equilibrium (e.g. sunspot equilib-
ria). However, from a computational point of view, it is more useful to restrict attention
to canonical correlated equilibria, correlated equilibria where the state space is identied
with the space of pure strategies, that is 
 = AN and, for each player, the partition Pi of

 is generated by Ai.
The following proposition states the strategic equivalence between correlated equilib-
rium and canonical correlated equilibrium7.
Proposition 2.1 Let (
; ; fPgNi=1; fqigNi=1) be a correlated equilibrium. Then there is a
canonical correlated equilibrium yielding the same distribution on actions and the same
expected payo to each player.
Based on this strategic equivalence, we will restrict attention to the concept of canonical
correlated equilibrium and, without ambiguity, refer to it as correlated equilibrium for
the remainder of the paper.
treatments can be found in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Forges (2009) and Sorin (1997).
7Proofs of all of the following propositions regarding correlated equilibrium can be found in Bergin
(2005) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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The following properties of correlated equilibrium will also be useful in identifying and
estimating the underlying parameters of our model:
Proposition 2.2 The set of Nash equilibrium payos is a subset of the set of correlated
equilibrium payos.
Proposition 2.3 The set of correlated equilibrium payos is a convex set.
Proposition (2.2) shows that the set of probability distributions over outcomes induced
by the set of Nash equilibria is equivalent to the set of probability distributions over
correlated equilibrium that are the product of independent probability distributions over
each player's actions. The convexity of the set of correlated equilibrium payos will
facilitate the computation of correlated equilibrium, the resulting identied region will
allow us to restrict attention to \extreme" correlated equilibria{for each outcome, the
equilibria that attach the least and the most probability to that outcome.
The nested relationship between correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium makes
our test of equilibrium concepts similar to the famous Hausman test (Hausman, 1978).
If the outcomes of the underlying game are consistent with Nash equilibrium, but the
researcher estimates the parameters of the game based on the concept of correlated equi-
librium, then the estimate are consistent but inecient, while if the outcomes are consis-
tent with correlated equilibrium, but the researcher estimates the game based on Nash
equilibrium, then the estimates are inconsistent.
Given the structure of the discrete normal form game described above, assume that
the observed outcomes of such a game are consistent with the concept of correlated equi-
librium, i.e., there exists a distribution  over the set of outcomes AN such that:
X
a i
ui(a i; ai; xi; i; 1)(a ijai) 
X
a i
ui(a i; a0i; xi; i; 1)(a ijai), 8a0i 2 Ai; i = 1; :::; N
(4)
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Our task is to estimate and draw an inference about the parameters of the payo functions,
1, and the parameters of the distribution of random preference shocks, 2, from the
observed outcomes aot , and some exogenous covariates which aect the payos, xt. Note
that the actual payo levels are unobserved, i.e., they are latent variables. To aid the
discussion, let S(u(x; ; 1)) denote the collection of distributions over outcomes which
satises the equilibrium condition (4), i.e., any distribution over outcomes associated with
a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game, given the payos associated with the
outcomes of the game. These payos, in turn, are determined by the set of covariates, x,
the set of random shocks,  and the parameters of the utility function 1. Let (u(x; ; 1))
denote a generic elements of the set S(u(x; ; 1)). For the purposes of exposition, we
will sometimes simply refer to it as , or  2 S(u(x; ; 1)).
3 Identication
The general strategy to identify the structural parameters of a game-theoretic econometric
model is to match the choice probabilities predicted by the model with the empirical
choice probabilities observed from the data (see Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov
(2010), Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). The empirical
choice probabilities can usually be obtained from the data nonparametrically. However,
the multiplicity of equilbria associated with a solution concept generally, and correlated
equilibrium in particular, in addition to the absence of an observed equilibrium selection
mechanism makes obtaining the choice probabilities predicted by the game structure
problematic. To solve this problem, we follow Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), who use the
restrictions on the distribution of the selection mechanism over the set of Nash equilibria
implied by the laws of probability to partially identify the model parameters. We use these
same restrictions over the set of correlated equilibria. This is in contrast to the approach of
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) who introduce an explicit equilibrium selection mechanism
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over the set of Nash equilibria to achieve point identication of structural parameters.
First enumerate the elements of A from a = f1; :::;#Ag. A is the set of pure strategy
proles and a 2 A. Given a correlated equilibrium  2 S(u(x; ; 1)) is a distribution
over A, we have
 = ((1); :::; (a); :::; (#A))0 (5)
and
#AX
a=1
(a) = 1;0  (a)  1;8a 2 A (6)
Let Y be the set of potentially observable outcomes. Since we assume that the observable
outcome of the game is the equilibrium actions chosen by all the players, then Y = A.
Let Pr(y = ajx; ) denote the the probability that action prole a be the equilibrium
action prole predicted by the model, where  = (1; 2), and let Pr(y = ajx) be the
empirical choice probability identied from the data which is independent of the values
of the structural parameters.
Identication requires the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The parameter space  is compact. Assumption
Assumption 2 The payos of one action for each player are xed at a known constant.
Assumption 3 The joint distribution of  = (i(a)), G(j2) is independent, indepen-
dent of x, and known to all agents and the econometrician, and let g(j2) be the
corresponding density.
Assumption 4 (Identication of Pr(yjx)) The econometrician observes data that
identies Pr(y = ajx), 8a 2 A.
Assumption 1, compactness of the parameter space is critical for the construction the
large sample property of our estimator (Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007)). As-
sumptions 2 and 3 are common in the literature (see Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer
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(2009)). Similar to the model environment, the phrasing we use here is taken from Bajari,
Hong, and Ryan (2010). One can clearly see from the equilibrium condition (4) that any
ane transformation of all deterministic payos does not change the set of equilibria.
Thus, the need for the location normalization of Assumption 2. The scale normalization
is included as part of Assumption 3. Assumption 4 requires that the empirical choice
probabilities can be identied from the data. Clearly, this is necessary since identication
relies on matching this probability with the choice probability predicted by the model.
As discussed before, the set of correlated equilibria, S(u(; x; )) will usually be an
uncountably innite set. If S(u(; x; )) is non-singleton, in order to derive the choice
probability predicted by the model, Pr(y = ajx; ), we need to introduce an equilibrium
selection mechanism:
 (jx; ) : S(u(x; ; 1))! [0; 1]d[S(u(x;;1))] (7)
such that
 (jx; )  0 and (8)
X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; ) = 1 (9)
where d[S(u(x; ; 1))] is the dimension of S(u(x; ; 1)). This equilibrium selection
mechanism species the probability,  (jx; ), that any correlated equilibrium  2
S(u(x; ; 1)) be the chosen equilibrium. Since the d[S(u(x; ; 1))] is, in general, innite,
we should use a continuous distribution to express this equilibrium selection mechanism,
but for purposes of exposition, we use the discrete distribution.
Given the equilibrium selection mechanism (7), the choice probabilities implied by the
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model can be written as:
Pr(y = ajx; ) =
Z 0@ X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a)
1A dG(j2) (10)
where (a) is the probability that action prole a is selected (or realized) if the correlated
equilibrium is , and  (jx; ) is the probability that  is the selected equilibrium. Thus,
 (jx; )(a) is the joint probability that action prole a and correlated equilibrium  are
selected. Clearly, action prole a may be associated with other correlated equilibria, thus
the summation of these probabilities,
X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a), is the probability that
action prole a is the selected equilibrium action prole. Based on the choice probabilities
implied by equation (10), we can dene the sharp identied set for the parameter  =
(1; 2).
Denition 3.1 (Sharp Identied Set) The sharp identied set for the parameter vec-
tor  2  is given by:
I =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
9 , 8a 2 Y
 2  : such that: E[Pr(y = ajx)] = E[Pr(y = ajx; )]
= E
24Z 0@ X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a)
1A dG(j2)
35
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(11)
Inference on the set I based on (11) is not practically feasible since one needs to deal
with the innite dimensional nuisance parameters  (jx; ) that result from the multiplic-
ity of equilibria. Note further that the equilibrium selection mechanism also depends on
the unobserved random preference shock . It is possible to follow the approach of Bajari,
Hong, and Ryan (2010) here and specify a parametric equilibrium selection mechanism
that is characterized by a nite number of parameters. In general, however, we do not
have sucient information to specify a particular equilibrium selection mechanism, and
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any misspecication of this mechanism will induce inconsistent estimation. For particular
model settings one may instead use a more rened equilibrium concept, such as per-
fect correlated equilibrium (Dhillon and Mertens, 1996) or maximum entropy correlated
equilibrium (Ortiz, Schapire, and Kakade, 2007). However, for general models such rene-
ments do not guarantee a unique equilibrium. In the spirit of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009),
we leave the equilibrium selection mechanism unspecied but, instead, exploit the fact
that the equilibrium selection mechanism  (jx; ) is a probability and hence bounded
between zero and one to derive a outer identied set for the structural parameters.
Since the equilibrium selection mechanism  (jx; ) is a probability distribution, then
0   (jx; )  1, 8 2 S(u(x; ; 1)) (12)
Based on this natural property of probability, we can derive an outer identied set for
the parameter . Formally, let Ha1 (;X) denote the lower bound of the choice probability
of action prole a implied by the model, Pr(y = ajx; ), and Ha2 (;X) the upper bound,
then:
Ha1 (;X) = min
Z 24 X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a)
35 dG(j2) (13)
Ha2 (;X) = max
Z 24 X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a)
35 dG(j2) (14)
Given the exogenous covariates, X, and payo parameter 1, dene R

1 (1; X) as the set
of random preference shocks  such that the game admits  as the unique equilibrium
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R2 (1; X) as the complement of R

1 (1; X) Thus we have:
Ha1 (;X)
= min
Z 24 X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a)
35 dG(j2) (15)
=
Z
R1 (;X)
(a)dG(j2)
| {z }
(1)
+
Z
R2 (;X)
minf(a) :  2 S(u(x; ; 1))gdG(j2):
| {z }
(2)
The last equality of equation (15) separates the calculation of the lower bound of the choice
probability of a into an integral over the support of the preference shocks that admits a
unique equilibrium and an integral over the support of the preference shocks that admits
multiple equilibria. The integrand of the rst integral (a) is the choice probability of the
unique correlated equilibrium  implied by the model over this support. The integrand of
the second integral is the probability of a associated with the correlated equilibrium that
realizes a with the lowest probability. The true equilibrium selection mechanism must
select outcome prole a with at least this probability. Thus, we identify the lower bound
of Pr(y = ajx; ). Similarly, the upper bound Ha2 (;X) can be derived as:
Ha2 (;X)
= max
Z 24 X
2S(u(x;;1))
 (jx; )(a)
35 dG(j2) (16)
=
Z
R1 (;X)
(a)dG(j2)
| {z }
(1)
+
Z
R2 (;X)
maxf(a) :  2 S(u(x; ; 1))gdG(j2)
| {z }
(2)
In an equivalent fashion to equation (15), the integrand of the second integral on the
last line of (16) is the probability of a associated with the correlated equilibrium that
realizes a with the highest probability. The true equilibrium selection mechanism can
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select outcome prole a with no more than this probability. Thus, we identify the upper
bound of Pr(y = ajx; ).
Based on the lower bound and upper bound of the choice probabilities implied by the
model, we have:
Ha1 (;X)  Pr(y = ajx; )  Ha2 (;X) (17)
And when  2 I
E[Pr(y = ajx)] = E[Pr(y = ajx; )] (18)
Thus we can dene the outer identied set for the model parameter  as:
Denition 3.2 (Outer Identied Region) The outer identied set for model param-
eter  = (1; 2) 2  is
O =
8>>>><>>>>:
8a 2 Y
 2  : such that:
E[Ha1 (;X)]  E[Pr(y = ajx)]  E[Ha2 (;X)]
9>>>>=>>>>; (19)
By introducing the following denitions:
H1(;X) = (H
1
1 (;X); :::; H
a
1 (;X); :::; H
#A
1 (;X))
0
H2(;X) = (H
1
2 (;X); :::; H
a
2 (;X); :::; H
#A
2 (;X))
0
and
Pr (yjx) = (Pr(y = 1jx); :::;Pr(y = ajx); :::;Pr(y = #Ajx))0;
conditions that dene the outer identied set can be stated as:
E[H1(;X)]  E[Pr(yjx)]  E[H2(;X)] (20)
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Note that the outer identied set O is broader than the sharp identied set I . Given
that we do not have enough information about the equilibrium selection mechanism, the
outer identied set O is the most we can learn about parameter  from the underlying
game and observed data. In general, the set is not a singleton, as it is characterized by the
moment inequality restrictions. Such a model is called a partially identied econometric
model, in contrast to the usual point identied case.
4 Estimation
The estimation problem is based on the moment inequality (20)
E[H1(;X)]  E[Pr (yjx)]  E[H2(;X)]: (21)
We follow Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) which provide a general framework for
moment inequality models to build a consistent estimator for the outer identied set O.
Since the upper and lower bounds in moment conditions (21) contain multi-dimensional
integrals, we rst provide a simulation procedure to approximate these integrals. Due to
the discreteness problem associated with simple Monte Carlo integration, we make use
instead of importance sampling Monte Carlo integration, in the spirit of Ackerberg (2009)
and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010)8.
4.1 Importance Sampling Approximation
Importance sampling is most noted for its ability to reduce simulation error and com-
putational burden, and was rst used in game-theoretic models by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2010). From the derivation (15) of Ha1 (;X) and (16) of H
a
2 (;X) it is easily seen that
(aju) and the set of correlated equilibria S(u(x; ; 1)) are both determined by the payo
8McFadden (1989) noted the ability to use importance sampling to smooth simulations which is
extended by Ackerberg (2009).
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level u, and are inuenced by 1 only through its eect on u. Thus, we can change the
variable of integration in (15) and (16) from  to u. Let h(ujX; ) denote the density of u,
conditional on x and . Based on the utility function ui(a; xi; i; 1) = i(xi; a; 1) + i(a)
and the density for , g(j2), h(ujX; ) can be derived as:
h(ujX; ) =
Y
i
Y
a2A
g(ui(a)  i(xi; a; 1)j2) (22)
Thus,
Ha1 (;X)
=
Z
R1 (;X)
(aju)dG(j2) +
Z
R2 (;X)
minf(aju) :  2 S(u(x; ; 1))gdG(j2) (23)
=
Z
R01
(aju)h(ujX; )du+
Z
R02
minf(aju) :  2 S(u)gh(ujX; )du
and
Ha2 (;X)
=
Z
R1 (;X)
(aju)dG(j2) +
Z
R2 (;X)
maxf(aju) :  2 S(u(x; ; 1))gdG(j2) (24)
=
Z
R01
(aju)h(ujX; )du+
Z
R02
maxf(aju) :  2 S(u)gh(ujX; )du
where R01 is the set of u such that the game admits a unique equilibrium, and R
0
2 is the
set of u such that the game admits multiple equilibria. By introducing an importance
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density q(u), we can rewrite (23) and (24) as:
Ha1 (;X)
=
Z
R01
(aju)h(ujX; )
q(u)
q(u)du+
Z
R02
minf(aju) :  2 S(u)gh(ujX; )
q(u)
q(u)du (25)
and
Ha2 (;X)
=
Z
R01
(aju)h(ujX; )
q(u)
q(u)du+
Z
R02
maxf(aju) :  2 S(u)gh(ujX; )
q(u)
q(u)du (26)
We can then simulate Ha1 (;X) and H
a
2 (;X) by drawing random variables
(u1; :::; uns; :::; uNS) from the importance density q(u). Note that here uns is a vector;
a vector of utilities for all of the players of the underlying game. Based on these simu-
lated utility values, the importance sampling simulators for Ha1 (;X) and H
a
2 (;X) are
~Ha1 (;X) and ~H
a
2 (;X), respectively.
~Ha1 (;X) =
1
NS
X
ns
I(uns 2 R01)(ajuns)h(u
nsjX;)
q(uns)
+
1
NS
X
ns
I(uns 2 R02)minf(ajuns) :  2 S(uns)gh(u
nsjX;)
q(uns)
(27)
~Ha2 (;X) =
1
NS
X
ns
I(uns 2 R01)(ajuns)h(u
nsjX;)
q(uns)
+
1
NS
X
ns
I(uns 2 R02)maxf(ajuns) :  2 S(uns)gh(u
nsjX;)
q(uns)
(28)
From the theory of importance sampling, ~Ha1 (;X) and ~H
a
2 (;X) are unbiased simulators
forHa1 (;X) andH
a
2 (;X), respectively. Most importantly, these simulators will generally
be continuous in the parameter  since they only depend on  through h(ujx; ) which is
continuous in  given that g(j2) is continuous.
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The theory of importance sampling proves ~Ha1 (;X) and ~H
a
2 (;X) that are smooth and
unbiased simulators for any choice of the importance density q(u) which has suciently
large support. However, as noted by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), as a practical matter,
it is important to make sure that the tails of the importance density are not too thin in a
neighborhood of the parameter which optimizes the objective function in our estimation
procedure. We suggest using some pre-estimated  to construct the importance density
q(u) = h(ujX;); (29)
which can be obtained from the estimates of the game with incomplete information de-
veloped by Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010), or through the generalized
maximum entropy estimator for static games of complete information (Golan, Karp, and
Perlo, 2000). Note that these two studies on empirical games are both based on the
concept of Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Estimation
Given the simulators obtained from the importance sampling, ~Ha1 (;X) and ~H
a
2 (;X),
for Ha1 (;X) and H
a
2 (;X), respectively, dene
~H1(;X) = ( ~H
1
1 (;X); :::; ~H
a
1 (;X); :::; ~H
#A
1 (;X))
0
~H2(;X) = ( ~H
1
2 (;X); :::; ~H
a
2 (;X); :::; ~H
#A
2 (;X))
0
From (21) we get the following simulated moment inequality restrictions:
E[ ~H1(;Xt)]  E[Pr(yjxt)]  E[ ~H2(;Xt)] (30)
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According to Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), our inferential procedure uses the
objective function9:
min
2
Q() 
Z (Pr(yjx)  ~H1(;X)) 2 + (Pr(yjx)  ~H2(;X))+2 dFx (31)
to estimate the unknown parameters associated with (30). If Pr(yjx) < ~H1(;X),
then
(Pr(yjx)  ~H1(;X)) 2 is strictly positive, and if Pr(yjx) > ~H2 (;X), then(Pr(yjx)  ~H2(;X))+2 is strictly positive. It is easy to see that Q()  0 for all
 2  and that Q() = 0 if and only if  2 O.
To estimate the outer identied set O, we need to take a sample analog of Q().
First replace Pr(yjx) with a pT consistent estimator PT (X)10. The sample analog for
Q() is
QT () =
1
T 2
TX
t=1
((PT (Xt)  ~H1(;Xt)) 2 + PT (Xt)  ~H2(;Xt))+2 : (32)
Our estimation for O is any solution that minimizing (32), which can be obtained from:
^O = f 2  : TQT ()  vTg (33)
where vT !1 and vTT ! 0, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) propose a resampling
method to obtain a suitable vT .
Proposition 4.1 Let Assumption 3 hold. Suppose that the regularity conditions of The-
orem 3.1 in Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) hold. Then we have that ^O is a
Hausdor consistent estimator for O, that is, dH(^O;O) = 0 with probability one.
9Let k x k+=k (x)+ k and k x k =k (x)  k, where (x)+ := max(x; 0), (x)  := max( x; 0) and k  k
is the Euclidian norm.
10The convergence rate of nonparametric estimates for PT (X) are slower than
p
T when there are
continuous variables in x, a useful method is to discretize all the variables in x and use nonparametric
frequency estimation.
20
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is the same as that for Theorem 3.1 in Chernozhukov, Hong,
and Tamer (2007). To conduct inference about the above moment inequalities model, we
use the methodology of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) and Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009), which requires construction of a set CT for a prespecied  2 (0; 1) such that
lim
T!1
(O 2 CT )   for any O 2 O: (34)
Our construction is as follows. Let
CT (c) =
n
 2  : T

QT () min
z
QT (z)

 c
o
: (35)
We iterate once over the following steps:
1. Compute an initial estimate for O as CT (c0), for example CT (c0) = CT (0), then sub-
sample the statistic T (QT () minz QT (z)) for  2 CT (0) and obtain the estimate
of its -quantile, c1(0).
2. Update c through c1 = sup02CT (c0) c1(0) and return to step 1, but replace c0 with
c1.
Thus, CT (c2) is our condence region for ^O. See Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007)
and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) for more detail on this. Such a condence region not only
has the desired coverage property, but is also consistent in the sense of Theorem 4.1.
4.3 Computation of the Equilibria
The simulated lower and upper bounds, ~Ha1 (;X) and ~H
a
2 (;X), contain the following
equilibrium computations:
I(u 2 R01)(aju) (36)
I(u 2 R02)minf(aju) :  2 S(u)g (37)
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and
I(u 2 R02)maxf(aju) :  2 S(u)g (38)
where u is a vector which contains the utility levels of all the players for each action
prole. We rst discuss the computation of (37) and (38), where the corresponding game
admits multiple equilibria. First note that if once we identify the regions R01 and R
0
2,
then we only need to compute the correlated equilibrium which realizes action prole a
with the lowest probability and compute the correlated equilibrium which realizes action
prole a with the highest probability Both of these can be obtained through simple linear
programming. The rst correlated equilibrium solves
min

(a)
s:t:
8>>><>>>:
X
a i
ui(a i; ai)(a i; ai) 
X
a i
ui(a i; ~ai)(a i; ai), 8i; ai and ~ai 6= aiX
a2A
(a) = 1; (a)  0,
(39)
and the second solves
max

(a)
s:t:
8>>><>>>:
X
a i
ui(a i; ai)(a i; ai) 
X
a i
ui(a i; ~ai)(a i; ai), 8i; ai and ~ai 6= aiX
a2A
(a) = 1; (a)  0.
(40)
If the game has a unique equilibrium, then the solution for the system of linear inequalities:
X
a i
ui(a i; ai)(a i; ai) 
X
a i
ui(a i; ~ai)(a i; ai), 8i; ai and ~ai 6= aiX
a2A
(a) = 1; (a)  0
(41)
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is unique. Thus, this unique equilibrium solves both linear program (39) and (40), which
means that, in practice, we do not need to identify payos based on whether or not they
admit multiple equilibria. The only computation required is linear program (39) or (40).
Clearly, the computation of equilibria in our procedure is very simple. Studies which focus
on empirical estimation of complete information games based on Nash equilibrium, need
to compute all the Nash equilibrium of underlying game, which will, in general, induce a
heavy computational burden. See for example, Berry and Tamer (2007), Bajari, Hong,
and Ryan (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
5 Test of Equilibrium Concepts
In this paper, we use correlated equilibrium to empirically identify and estimate a static
complete information game. Of course, it is an open question which equilibrium concept
most appropriately model strategic choices. A non-exhaustive of solution concepts used
in the literature include pure strategy Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibrium,
correlated equilibrium and evolutionary equilibrium. In this section we outline a formal
empirical test of the suitablility of Nash equilibrium as a solution concept as compared
to correlated equilibrium.
Formally, let CE denote the set of parameter estimates of a static complete information
game using correlated equilibrium as the solution concept and NE the set of parameter
estimates of the same game using Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. Since both
solution concepts can be characterized by moment inequality restrictions, then
CE =
[
2
CE; NE =
[
2B
NE; (42)
where
CE = fCE : ECEmj(Xi; )  0, j 2 JCEg (43)
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and
NE = fNE : ENEgj(Xi; )  0, j 2 JNEg: (44)
If fXi 2 Xgni=1 is the sample generated from distribution , and mj(Xi; ) and gj(Xi; )
are moment functions characterized by nite dimensional parameter  and , respec-
tively, then ECEmj(Xi; )  0 is equivalent to the moment inequalities (20), while
ENEgj(Xi; )  0 is equivalent to the moment conditions in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)11.
Given the above structure, we want to test which of the two distributions CE and NE ,
is closer to the true distribution . Since both solution concepts are dened in terms of
moment inequality restrictions, we can make use of the test for moment inequality models
developed by Shi (2010). Consider the null hypothesis:
H0 : d(CE ; ) = d(NE ; ) (45)
where
d(CE ; ) = inf
CE2CE
d(CE; ); d(NE ; ) = inf
NE2NE
d(NE; ): (46)
The distance d(P; ) is dened as the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure:
d(P; ) =
Z
p log pd; (47)
where p is the density of P with respect to . We now construct the test statistics. For
a data distribution , dene the Lagrange multipliers:
() = argmin

exp(0m(Xi; )) (48)
() = argmin

exp(0g(Xi; )) (49)
11The moment conditions in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) are based on pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
to obtain the moment conditions for Nash equilibrium, one needs to extend that result. Berry and Tamer
(2007) briey discuss the problems that arise when allowing for mixed strategies.
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and criterion functions:
M(; ) = E exp(0m(Xi; )) (50)
G(; ) = E exp(0g(Xi; )) (51)
Shi (2010) prove that the null hypothesis (45) can be stated as:
H0 : max
2
M((); ) = max
2B
G((); ) (52)
The sample analog of M((); ) and G((); ) are:
M^n(; ) = 1
n
nX
i=1
exp(0m(Xi; )); G^n(; ) = 1
n
nX
i=1
exp(0g(Xi; )) (53)
where
^n() = argmin

M^n(; ); ^n() = argmin

G^n(; )
^n = argmax
2
M^n(^n(); ) B^n = argmax
2B
G^n(^n(); )
(54)
Then we can use the quasi-likelihood ratio statistic
QLRn = max
2
M^n(^n(); ) max
2B
G^n(^n(); ) (55)
to test the null hypothesis, equation(52).
With several regularity conditions, Shi (2010) proves that under H0:
QLRn
d N(0; $2n) (56)
where $2n = E[exp(

(
)0m(Xi; ))   exp(n()0g(Xi; ))]2,  2
argmax2M((); ),  2 argmax2B G((); ). In practice, $2n can be
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replaced with its sample analog $^2n:
$^2n = sup
2^n;2B^n
1
n
X

[exp(^n()
0m(Xi; ))  exp(^n()0g(Xi; ))]2: (57)
The test criterion is
Test of Correlated Equilibrium versus Nash Equilibrium Let bn be a sequence of
positive numbers such that b 1n + n
 1bn ! 0. Given the nominal size  and the
(1  =2) quantile of the standard normal distribution, z=2:
(1) If n$^2n > bn and n
1
2QLRn=$^n > z=2, then reject H0 in favor of the hypothesis that
correlated equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept.
(2) If n$^2n > bn and n
1
2QLRn=$^n <  z=2, then reject H0 in favor of the hypothesis
that Nash equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept.
(3) If $^2n and n
1
2QLRn=$^n do not satisfy the condition in (1) and (2), then do not reject
the null H0.
This test criterion is based on the nested model selection test of Shi (2010). Recall
Proposition 2.2, which states that the set of Nash equilibrium payos is a subset of the
set of correlated equilibrium payos. An interesting case is when the test does not reject
the null hypothesis. This implies that correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are
equally eective in explaining the observed data, or, put dierently, the set of Nash
equilibria is (approximately) equal to the set of correlated equilibria. Finally, the nesting
of Nash equilibrium with correlated means that using correlated equilibrium to estimate
empirical games is robust to the true state being that the appropriate solution concept
is Nash equilibrium, but inecient in this state. If instead, the true equilibrium concept
is correlated equilibrium, then except in the special case that all correlated equilibria of
the game are Nash equilibria , using Nash equilibrium to estimate the game will produce
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inconsistent estimates. This is similar to the choice between xed eect and random eect
in panel data models.
6 Monte Carlo Simulation
To demonstrate the performance of our estimates in nite samples, we conduct a Monte
Carlo experiment using a simple static 2 2 entry game. In each of the T repetitions of
the static complete information game, each has the following structure:
0 1
0 (0; 0) (0; 2(0; 1))
1 (1(1; 0); 0) (1 + 1(1; 1); 2 + 2(1; 1))
The action set of each player is Ai = f0; 1g, where 0 means no entry and 1 means entry.
The utility function for player i is dened as:
ui(a; i(a); ) = I(ai = 1)(1a i + i(a)) (58)
As a simple experiment, we have not included any exogenous covariates x here. In accor-
dance with the location and scale normalization requirement for identication, we set the
utility of no entry equal to 0 and the variance of the random preference shock equal to 1.
Thus, we only need to estimate the strategic eect parameters 1 and 2.
All random preference shocks 1t(1; 0), 2t(0; 1), 1t(1; 1) and 2t(1; 1) are independently
drawn from a standard normal distribution. The parameter space  is set to  = [ 5; 5]2,
and the true values are
1 =  0:5; 2 =  1 (59)
Thus, entry by player i will decrease the payo of player j given entry by player j. Given
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these random shocks and parameters, we generate the outcome of each game, i.e., the
observed action proles, by a simple maximum entropy equilibrium selection mechanism
that solves
max

 
X
a2A
(a) ln (a)
s:t:
8>>><>>>:
X
a i
ui(a i; ai)(a i; ai) 
X
a i
ui(a i; ~ai)(a i; ai), 8i; ai and ~ai 6= aiX
a2A
(a) = 1; (a)  0.
(60)
Obviously, this maximum entropy equilibrium selection mechanism will generate the most
dispersive correlated equilibrium  among all correlated equilibria. We use simple random
sampling on  to determine which action prole will be played. Based on the maximum
entropy equilibrium selection mechanism, with a sample size of 500,
E[Pr(yt)] = (0:291058; 0:274005; 0:35475; 0:080187): (61)
We use the following procedure to estimate Equation (33). First, we use a simulated
annealing algorithm to nd a solution to the minimization of Equation (32), which we
denote by ~. Then we use rich directions12 to grid search within the parameter space 
until it condition (33) is satised.
We generate 1000 samples of size T = 500; 1000 to assess the nite sample properties
of our estimator. We rst use the importance sampling simulator to get simulated bounds
of choice probabilities, then, based on the above numerical procedure compute the nal
estimates. The interval estimates are reported in Table 1, and the set estimators for
T = 500 and T = 1000 are compared in Figure 1. Since we lack information regarding the
true range of the outer identied set, we can not say much about the performance of our
12In this experiment, we choose 402 directions, which are randomly chosen according to a uniform
distribution over [0; 2].
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Table 1: The Results of the Monte Carlo Simulations
Initial Value For Set Estimation Interval Estimates
T = 500
1  0:5677 [ 2:3142; 0:9580]
2  1:0273 [ 2:8319; 0:4027]
T = 1000
1  0:5659 [ 2:2794; 0:9370]
2  1:0267 [ 2:8184; 0:3816]
Monte Carlo Repetitions: 1000
Importance Sampling Repetitions: 999
estimator, except that the true value of the parameter lies in our estimated set. Moreover,
from Figure 1 we see that when the sample size increase, the range of ^O decreases, which
is similar to convergence in the point identied case, but that the size of the set remains
large at this sample size.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a framework for identifying and estimating the normal-form
payo parameters of a discrete, static, complete information game where the equilibrium
concept employed is correlated equilibrium. Compared with existing studies based on
Nash equilibrium, this extension of the equilibrium concepts simplies the identication
and estimation of game-theoretic econometric models, since our approach does not require
the computation of the full set of equilibria, it only needs to compute some "extreme"
equilibria which can be obtained through linear programming. We deal with the pres-
ence of multiple equilibria, by making use of the moment inequality restrictions induced
by the underlying game-theoretic econometric models, rather than making any assump-
tions regarding equilibrium selection Thus we avoid the potential for misspecication of
the equilibrium selection mechanism.This leads to the estimation of a partially identi-
ed model. Given the outer identied set characterized by moment restrictions, the set
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Figure 1: The estimated outer identied set ^O for dierent sample sizes.
estimator developed by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) is used to obtain its esti-
mates. The importance sampling technique is used to reduce computational burden and
overcome the non-smoothness problems. We also show that the model selection tests for
moment inequality models developed by Shi (2010) can be used to test equilibrium con-
cepts such as correlated equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium. The greatest limitation of
our estimation method is that it requires the distribution of random preference shocks to
be known by the researcher. Estimation of such models in ignorance of the the distribution
of random preference shocks is an important topic for future research. Another possible
extension is to update our estimator to one based on conditional moment restrictions.
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